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Abstract—Detection of different types of image editing opera-
tions carried out on an image is an important problem in image
forensics. It gives the information about the processing history
of an image, and also can expose forgeries present in an image.
There have been few methods proposed to detect different types
of image editing operations in a single framework. However, all
the operations have to be known a priori in the training phase.
But, in real-forensics scenarios it may not be possible to know
about the editing operations carried out on an image. To solve
this problem, we propose a novel deep learning-based method
which can differentiate between different types of image editing
operations. The proposed method classifies image patches in a
pair-wise fashion as either similarly or differently processed using
a deep siamese neural network. Once the network learns feature
that can discriminate between different image editing operations,
it can differentiate between different image editing operations
not present in the training stage. The experimental results show
the efficacy of the proposed method in detecting/discriminating
different image editing operations.
Index Terms—Image Forensics, Deep Learning, CNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the availability of various image editing software,
it has become possible to create visually plausible image
forgeries with a minimal effort. Because of this, a large number
of forged images are now available on the web. These images
when used on different platforms, like the electronic and social
media, may create tensions in the society. These concerns
necessitate the development of image forensics techniques
for checking the authenticity of images before using them as
critical information.
While creating a forgery, the forged parts are often pro-
cessed through different image editing operations to make
them look visually plausible. For example, in image splicing
forgery the spliced objects go through different image edit-
ing operations, e.g. resizing, rotating, smoothening, contrast
enhanecment, compression. Although imperceptible to human
eyes, every image editing operation leaves a unique trace of
manipulation. These traces are utilized by researchers to detect
different types of editing operations performed on images.
Different techniques have been proposed to extract features
related to the traces left by different editing operations, and
which are utilized to check the authenticity of images. For
example, in [1], [2], [3] the authors extracted features for
detecting the traces left by resizing and resampling operations,
in [4], [5], [6] features related to median filtering traces are
extracted, in [7], [8] features are extracted to detect contrast-
enhancement operation, and in [9] JPEG artifact related fea-
tures are extracted for forgery detection.
Although these methods are good at detecting splicing,
methods from each of the categories work only under their
respective assumptions about the traces of manipulations left
by the forgery process. For example, the median filtering
detection methods cannot detect traces left by the resam-
pling operation. To handle this limitation, researchers have
focused to develop universal forensics methods, which can
detect multiple manipulations in a single framework. The
first universal forensics method was proposed by Qiu et
al. [10], where different steganalysis features were used to
detect different types of image processing operations. The
method is based on the observation that different image editing
operations destroy the natural statistics of the image pixels
present in an authentic image in the same way steganography
methods do while manipulating the pixels for embedding a
message. Fan et al. [11] proposed another general-purpose
forensics method for detecting different types of image editing
operations. The authors proposed to create a Gaussian mixture
model (GMM) of image patches corresponding each editing
operation. Then, the average log-likelihood of patches under
the different GMMs corresponding to different classes are
compared to decide the class of the patches.
Inspired by the success in other computer vision areas,
the forensics community has recently focused on applying
deep learning-based methods for image manipulation detec-
tion. Chen et al. [12] proposed the first deep learning-based
median filtering detection method. This is the first deep
learning-based image manipulation detection method, where
the first layer computes the median filtering residual and the
subsequent layers extract and classify the features useful for
median filtering detection. Bayar and Stamm [13] proposed a
deep learning-based universal forensics method for detecting
different types of image manipulating operations. The image
editing features are automatically learned from the training
data by employing a convolutional neural network (CNN)
[14]. The authors proposed a new convolutional layer, which
suppresses the image content and enhances features important
for detecting different editing operations.
Although these universal manipulation detection methods
perform really well, all the manipulation operations have to be
known before training the network. However, there is a large
number of image editing operations available in the image
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2editing software, e.g. Adobe Photoshop and GIMP. Also, new
image editing operations are being developed and incorporated
in these editing software. In addition to that, there may be
multiple editing operations performed subsequently to make
the spliced parts look similar to the authentic parts. Therefore,
it is not practical to incorporate all the editing operations in the
training process as required by the existing univeral manipula-
tion detection methods, i.e. [10], [11], [13]. This necessitates
the developement of universal forensics method which can not
only detect the different image editing operations present in
the training stage, but also is capable of generalizing to editing
operations not present in the training stage.
This paper proposes a novel deep learning-based forensics
method for detecting image manipulations. The proposed
method takes two image patches as input, and check whether
they come from the same or different manipulation operations.
The proposed method is built upon the work of Bayar and
Stamm [13], where they showed that CNNs are capable of
learning accurate image editing features automatically from
the training data. However, instead of learning features to
classify image patches to different manipulation classes, the
proposed method learns the features which can discriminate
different image editing operations. The reason for this is that
from the forensics point of view it is more informative to
check whether two image patches have undergone the same
type of manipulations or not than classifying individual image
patch. For this, the proposed method employs a deep siamese
CNN, which has twin CNNs accepting two image patches
as the input and classifies the patch pair as either identically
processed (IP) or differently processed (DP).
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we explain the deep learning-based universal
forensics method [13] proposed by Basar and Stamm as
the background. The method is based on the assumption
that each image editing operation leaves behind the trace of
the particular manipulation. These traces can be detected by
examining the relationship between the neighbouring pixels, as
any image manipulation destroys the natural statistics of pixels
and modifies them in a unique way [10]. To automatically learn
the features useful for the detection different manipulation
operations, the authors of [13] proposed to employ a CNN.
A CNN is a special type of neural networks originally
proposed for handwritten digit recognition [14]. Since then,
they have been successfully used in many other computer
vision problems with some variations in its architecture [15],
[16]. A CNN typically contains a stack of multiple layers
with nonlinearities which enable it to learn different features
from the training data itself. The typical layers present in a
CNN are the convolutional layer, the pooling layer, and the
fully connected layer. The convolutional layer contains several
filters which convolve with the input image in parallel and
the element-wise rectified linear unit (ReLU) for non-linear
mapping. The output of the convolutional layer is called the
feature map, and given by
f lk = max(0,
∑
j
f l−1j ∗ wlkj + blk) (1)
where, ∗ is the convolution operation, f lk is the kth feature map
in layer l, wlkj is the filter connecting the jth feature map in
layer l− 1 to the kth feature map in layer l and blk is the bias
for the kth feature map in layer l. The convolutional layer is
followed by a max-pooling layer, which reduces the size of
each feature map by taking the maximum value over a region.
The stacking of the convolutional and pooling layers one after
another enables the CNNs to learn different levels of features
at different layers. The initial layers learn low-level features
and the final layers learn more problem-specific features.
To classify the final features, one or more fully-connected
layers are stacked on the top of the final convolutional and
pooling layers. The sigmoid non-linearity is used in the fully-
connected layer, producing the output in the range of [0, 1].
The parameters w and b are learnt in the training process using
the standard gradient descent-based backpropagation technique
[14].
CNNs have proved to be very good in different com-
puter vision tasks, e.g. object detection and recognition [15].
However, they did not perform well when applied directly
to image manipulation detection [17]. This is because the
conventional CNNs capture the image content rather than im-
portant forensics features. To suppress the image content and
enhance the relationship between neighbouring pixels, Bayar
and Stamm proposed a new convolutional layer as the first
layer of the CNN. The filters in this new convolutional layer
are constrained to learn a set of prediction error filters. The
concept of using the prediction error filters in the first layer
is motivated from different image forensics and steganalysis
methods. Steganalysis methods like the rich models [18] and
the subtractive pixel adjacency matrix (SPAM) [19] utilise this
concept of using different prediction filters for computing the
prediction errors, which are later used as features to detect
hidden messages present in the stago images. In forensics,
Chen et al. [17] proposed a similar strategy to first extract
the median filtering residuals and then using a CNN for the
detection of the median filtering operation.
In [13], the filters in the first convolutional layer of the
CNN are forced to learn a set of prediction error filters by
constraining the weights in each of the K filters as
w1k(0, 0) = −1
and
∑
l,m6=0
w1k(l,m) = 1
(2)
where, w1k(l,m) denotes the weight at position (l,m) of the
kth filter and w1k(0, 0) denotes the weight at the center of
the corresponding filter kernel. This procedure is repeated
for all the pixels in the image patch by moving the kernels
throughout the patch. This prediction error layer extracts the
local dependency of pixels with its neighbours, which is the
important information from the forensics point of view [10].
Using this approach, Bayar and Stamm detected four dif-
ferent types image editing operations, namely the Gaussian
filtering, the median filtering, the corruption of the image by
the AWGN and resampling, with good accuracies.
3III. PROPOSED METHOD
The universal forensics method proposed by Bayar and
Stamm [13] shows that CNNs can automatically learn features
important for detecting different image editing operations.
However, there are some limitations of the method. For
training the CNN, all the image editing operations should
be known a priori. If an image is edited with an operation
other than the ones used for training, the method will not
be able to detect it properly. Moreover, in a real forgery,
there may be multiple editing operations performed on the
image subsequently. In this case also, the method [13] will
fail as the CNN is trained to classify the images only to one
of the many editing operations, not combinations of different
manipulations.
To overcome these limitations, we propose a method which
checks whether two image patches have undergone the same
operation or two different operations. For this, we employ a
deep siamese CNN which takes a pair of image patches as
input and classify these as either IP or DP. The reasons for
the pair-wise classification image patches are as follows:
1) The spliced regions in an image may go through differ-
ent image editing operations than the authentic regions.
Therefore, from the forensics point of view, it is more
informative to know whether all the patches of an image
have been manipulated in the same way or not.
2) The pair-wise classification of patches removes the ne-
cessity of classifying the patches into different manip-
ulation classes. This is an important advantage of the
proposed method, as it allows the proposed method to
classify image patches coming from a different type of
manipulation not considered in the training stage.
3) Since, the methods [10], [11] and [13] classify the
image patches into one of the different but fixed types
of manipulations, they are more vulnerable to anti-
forensics. This is because the anti-forensics methods
can be developed to hide the traces left by each of
the operations considered in these methods [20]. On
the other hand, the proposed method does not learn
any class-specific feature as it is designed to check
whether two patches have undergone the same type of
manipulation or not. Hence, developing anti-forensics
techniques to counter the proposed method will be more
difficult.
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the proposed frame-
work. It has twin neural networks CNN1 and CNN2 sharing
the same set of weights. It accepts two input images, which
are independently processed by CNN1 and CNN2 and then
a distance layer [21] computes a distance metric between
the outputs of the twin networks. Because of the sharing of
weights, CNN1 and CNN2 map two similar input images to
very close points in the feature space. The proposed siamese
CNN automatically learns the features that can check whether
a pair of images has been similarly or differently manipulated.
A. Network Architecture
1) CNN: As in [13], the first convolutional layer in each
of CNN1 and CNN2 is a constrained convolutional layer. The
Fig. 1: Framework of the siamese network to classify patch
pairs as IP or DP.
filters in the constrained convolutional layer are forced to learn
a set of prediction error filters, which suppress image contents
and produce prediction error. Each of CNN1 and CNN2 has
the architecture shown in Figure 2. It contains 3 convolutional
layers, 2 max-pooling layers and 3 fully-connected layers. The
block diagram of the CNN is shown in Figure 2. The first
convolutional layer is the constrained convolutional layer [13]
with 16 prediction error filters of size 5 × 5 and stride 1.
Its weights follow the constraints given by Equation (2). This
layer is followed by an unconstrained convolutional layer with
64 filters of size 7 × 7 with stride 2. The ReLU nonlinearity
is applied element-wise to the output of this layer followed
by the max-pooling layer with a kernel size 3 × 3 and stride
2. The output of this layer is fed to another unconstrained
convolutional layer with 128 filters of size 3× 3 and stride 1.
The ReLU nonlinearity is applied element-wise to the output
of this layer. It is followed by a max-pooling layer with a
kernel size 3 × 3 and stride 2. This layer is followed by
three fully-connected layers with 4096, 4096 and 2048 neurons
respectively. The sigmoid non-linearity is used in each of these
layers. The neurons in the fully-connected layers are dropped
out [22] with a probability of 0.5 at each iteration of the
training process. The output of the final fully-connected layer
represents the features learned by the CNN.
2) Distance Layer: Given a pair of image patches x1 and x2
as input, CNN1 and CNN2 compute the feature vectors f1 and
f2 respectively. A distance layer computes a distance metric
between them, which is then fed to a single sigmoidal output
neuron. This neuron computes the prediction of the input
image patch pair as p = σ(
∑
j αj |f1(j)− f2(j)|), where σ
is the sigmoid non-linearity function and αj is a learnable
parameter representing the importance of each component of
the feature vectors in the classification of the patch-pair.
B. Learning
The proposed siamese network is a binary classifier with
label y(x1, x2) = 1 when both input image patches x1 and
x2 come from the same manipulation class, and y(x1, x2) = 0
when x1 and x2 come from two different manipulation classes.
The network is trained by minimising the average cross-
entropy loss function C over a batch of pairs given by [23]
4Fig. 2: The CNN architecture used in the proposed siamese network.
C =
1
M
M∑
i=1
y(xi1, x
i
2) log p(x
i
1, x
i
2)
+(1− y(xi1, xi2)) log(1− p(xi1, xi2))
(3)
where M is the number of images in each batch. The pa-
rameters of the network are learnt in the training phase by
minimising C using the stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-
based backpropagation technique. In SGD method, the weights
are updated in each iteration using the following equations:
wlkj = w
l
kj + ∆w
l
kj
∆wlkj = µ∆w
l
kj − η∇wlkjC − λw
l
kj
(4)
where, ∇wlkj is the gradient of C with respect to the weight
matrix wlkj , η is the learning rate, µ is the momentum and λ
is the L2 regularization term.
Once, the network is trained, it is used to detect/discriminate
the different image processing operations.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To train and test the proposed method, a dataset was created
using the unprocessed raw images taken from the Dresden
Image Database [24]. The database contains more than 14, 000
images with resolutions of about 2000 × 3000 captured by
73 different digital cameras. A set of 1566 raw images were
compressed in the JPEG format with 100% quality factor (QF)
and converted to grayscale images by considering only the
green channel of the images. We cropped image patches of size
150× 150 from these images, resulting in 114, 000 unaltered
image patches.
The proposed system was implemented using the Python-
based Keras [25] deep learning library on a Tesla K20c
GPU with 5 GB of RAM. The Nadam optimiser [26]
was used with the parameters set as: learning rate(η) =
0.002, momentum(µ) = 0.002 and decay = 0.005 and
regularization term(λ) = 0.0001. We have used the learn-
ing rate decay technique to converge to the minimum of C by
reducing the fluctuations [27]. The training batch size was set
to 16 images. We have used the batch normalisation technique
[28] as it helps in achieving faster convergence and higher
generalisation accuracy.
A. Manipulation Detection Results
To test the performance of the proposed siamese network
in detecting/discriminating different image editing operations,
we have carried out a series of experiments. For this, five
different versions of the 114, 000 unaltered patches are created
by editing them with the following operations: Gaussian blur-
ring, median filtering, resampling, corrupting with the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN), gamma correction. The details
of the manipulations are listed in Table I. This way, we obtain
114, 000 patches from the altered as well as from each of the
editing operations.
In the first experiment, we have trained the network using
the image patches coming from four different classes: original,
Gaussian blurring, median filtering, and resampling. We ran-
domly selected 40, 000 patches from each class to create the
training set. We sample 500, 000 IP pairs of patches randomly
where both image patches of a pair come from the same class
(i.e. both patches of a pair come either from unaltered class
or from the same manipulation class). Similarly, we sample
500, 000 DP pairs randomly, where the two patches of a pair
come from two different classes (e.g. one patch may come
from Gaussian blurring operation and the other may come
from Median filtering operation). To monitor the classification
performance of the network during training, we apply it on
a validation set which contains 10, 000 IP pairs and 10, 000
DP pairs that are not in the training set. Once, the model is
trained we check the performance of the method on a test set
which contains 50, 000 IP pairs and 50, 000 DP pairs.
The network was trained for 70, 000 iterations and stopped
when it started converging. Figure 3a shows the training
and validation losses with respect to iterations, and Figure
3b shows the training and validation accuracies with respect
to iterations. It can be seen that after 60, 000 iterations the
training loss and training accuracy start saturating indicating
the convergence the network. The validation accuracy also
reaches more than 99% after 60, 000 iterations and saturates.
We stop the training process at 70, 000 iterations and save the
final parameters of the model for the future use. To test the
performance of the model, the trained model was tested on
the test set which consists of 50, 000 IP pairs and 50, 000 DP
pairs. It is to be noted that, the test image patches also come
from the same four classes only. On this test set, the model
5TABLE I: Different manipulations considered in this paper
Editing Operation Detail
Gaussian blurring Kernel size = 5× 5 and standard deviation (σ) = 1.1
Median filtering Kernel size = 5× 5
Resampling Scaling factor = 1.5 and bilinear interpolation
Noise addition AWGN with standard deviation (σ) = 2
Gamma correction Parameter (γ) = 1.5
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: (a) Training and validation loss versus iteration. (b) Training and validation accuracy versus iteration.
achieves an accuracy of 99.38%. This experiment shows that
the proposed siamese network can discriminate the different
types of image editing operations with a very high accuracy.
Another experiment is carried out to compare our method
with Bayar and Stamm’s method. In this experiment, we check
the ability of the proposed method in classifying each of the
four manipulation types individually. For this, we have created
four different test sets as follows: for the Gaussian blurring test
set, 50, 000 IP pairs are created by taking both images of the
pairs from the Gaussian blurring only, and 50, 000 DP pairs are
created by taking one image from the Gaussian manipulation
and the other from any of the rest three classes. The test sets
for the original, the median filtering, and the resampling cases
are also created following the similar procedure. We have
checked the classification accuracies of the already trained
siamese network on these four test sets. For comparison, we
have implemented Bayar and Stamm’s method and tested its
performance on these test images. It should be noted that the
size of image patches used in this experiment is 150× 150 as
opposed to 227×227 used in the paper [13]. The classification
results are shown in Table II. The proposed method classifies
the original, the Gaussian blurred, the median filtered and
the resampled patches with accuracies of 99.35%, 99.51%,
99.64% and 99.26% respectively, whereas Bayar and Stamm’s
method classified with accuracies of 98.70%, 99.80%, 98.85%
and 99.13% respectively. These results show that except the
Gaussian manipulation, the proposed siamese network outper-
forms the CNN method [13] for all other manipulations.
The next experiment is carried out to see the ability of the
proposed method in discriminating manipulations not present
TABLE II: Classification accuracies on different manipulation
classes
Manipulation Proposed Method Bayar and Stamm [13]
Original 99.35 98.70
Gaussian blurring 99.51 99.80
Median filtering 99.64 98.75
Resampling 99.26 99.13
TABLE III: Classification accuracies on manipulations not
present in the training stage
Manipulation Accuracy (%)
AWGN ( σ = 2) 96.61
Gamma correction ( γ = 1.5) 95.24
at the training phase. We have trained the network using the
image patch pairs coming from the four classes as already
mentioned. We test it on a set which contains images coming
from a different type of manipulation. For this, we considered
two different manipulation classes obtained by corrupting the
images with AWGN and applying gamma correction opera-
tions on the image patches. For the AWGN case, we created
50, 000 IP pairs by taking both images of a pair from AWGN
class only, and 50, 000 DP pairs are created by taking one
image of the pair from AWGN and the other comes from one
of the four classes, i.e. the original, the Gaussian blurring, the
median filtering, and the resampling. On this set, the network
achieved a classification accuracy of 96.61%. Similarly, to see
the generalization ability of the network on gamma correction
class, we created 50, 000 IP and 50, 000 DP test pairs in the
6same manner, and tested the network on it. In this case, the
network achieved an accuracy of 95.24%. From these results,
it is evident that the network can discriminate images coming
from different types of manipulations, even if the images come
from manipulation classes not used in the training stage. Table
III summarises the generalisation accuracy of the method. It
should be noted that the existing universal forensics methods
[10], [11], [13] cannot be applied in this case. This is because
they can only classify images to one of the manipulations
present in the training stage. This is a huge advantage of the
proposed method over the state-of-the-art.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel image forensics method
which can discriminate different types of image manipulations
carried out on images. The proposed method employs a deep
siamese CNN which takes a pair of image patches as input and
decides whether they are identically or differently processed.
That is, instead of classifying image patches to some fixed
classes (types) of manipulations, the proposed method checks
whether two image patches are processed through the same
operation or not. Because of this, the proposed method can
even discriminate image manipulations which were not present
in the training stage. The experimental results show that the
proposed method can differentiate between different types of
manipulations with good accuracies.
The future work will involve further exploration of the
universal nature of the proposed method. Also, checking the
effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting real splicing
forgeries is another task included in the future work.
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